Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining by Iaryczower, M & Oliveros, S
Accepted Manuscript
Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining
Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros
PII: S0022-0531(15)00222-7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.011
Reference: YJETH 4512
To appear in: Journal of Economic Theory
Received date: 2 July 2014
Revised date: 6 December 2015
Accepted date: 23 December 2015
Please cite this article in press as: Iaryczower, M., Oliveros, S. Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining. J. Econ.
Theory (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.011
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are
providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting
proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could
affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
Power Brokers: Middlemen in
Legislative Bargaining
Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros∗
December 28, 2015
Abstract
We study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions
with transfers. We establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining
as a robust equilibrium phenomenon. We show that legislative intermediation can
impact policy outcomes, and can be ineﬃcient. To fulﬁll this role, the middleman’s
policy preferences and bargaining position must be such to make his role of in-
termediary credible. But the political middleman must also directly beneﬁt from
policy change. The results highlight fundamental diﬀerences between the role of
intermediaries in politics and exchange economies. JEL codes D72, C72, C78.
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1 Introduction
Most signiﬁcant public policy choices are decided in legislatures and other collective bod-
ies. From health care reform to national defense or regulation of economic activity, enact-
ing new policies requires mutual understanding among committee members with diﬀerent
political views. It also requires, more often than not, a variety of compromises and polit-
ical exchanges among these legislators.
The use of transfers to secure legislative support in legislatures around the world is widely
documented. This is standard operating procedure in multiparty presidential democracies,
where small regional or ethnic parties often act as brokers of political deals that require
the support of a national coalition. But it is also a common feature in the US Congress.
In the passage of the ﬁscal cliﬀ law, for instance, the use of special interest tax breaks
was so pervasive that “the law designed to reduce the deﬁcit added $74 billion in spending
through changes in the tax law.”1
This process of legislative bargaining has two readily observable characteristics. First,
political exchanges are rarely struck publicly and simultaneously at the time when a pro-
posal is up for a vote. Instead, compromises among members of a legislative coalition are
typically made in backroom deals, in a process of decentralized and sequential bargaining.
Second, whenever there are more than two legislative blocks, this process of decentralized
bargaining leads naturally to the emergence of legislative intermediaries. This was fun-
damental, for example, in the privatization of Argentina’s national gas and oil company
(YPF) in 1991, when then Governor of Santa Cruz and future President of Argentina
Nestor Kirchner brokered a deal that guaranteed the support of the coalition of oil pro-
ducing provinces in the Senate.2 The same is true in the US when some issues divide
Democrats and Republicans into more than two homogeneous blocks, as was the case
during the realignment of the South. In fact, the most notable example of a political
broker in american politics is that of Senate Majority leader (then President) Lyndon
Johnson (1955-61). As Caro (2002) points out, “From the time he became Majority
Leader, Johnson began using talk on the ﬂoor as a smoke screen for the maneuvering that
was taking place in the cloakrooms, . . . as a method of stalling the Senate to give him
1CBS evening news, January 2, 2013; ‘Fiscal cliﬀ’ bill had some hidden pork.
2See https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/954402/YPFKirchner.pdf
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time to work out his deals.”
Our goal in this paper is to study the dynamics of decentralized legislative bargaining:
how private agreements among parties aﬀect subsequent negotiations and policy outcomes,
and how parties’ conjectures of future negotiations aﬀect agreements in the ﬁrst place. In
particular, we seek to explain the emergence and role of legislative intermediaries. These
actors are often crucial in decentralized bargaining, but mostly ignored in the bargaining
literature. Can some legislative actors enable political deals by putting together two
parties that would not negotiate directly with one another? What do these power brokers
bring to the table?
We address these questions within a simple model of decentralized legislative bargaining,
which bridges traditional legislative bargaining models with models of competitive market
for votes.
To capture the sequential and decentralized nature of bargaining that we observe in po-
litical deals, we depart from centralized bargaining models in the Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) tradition. Because in these models a proposer makes an oﬀer to all members of
a coalition simultaneously, intermediaries are ruled out by ﬁat. We also depart from the
prevailing approach to study decentralized buying and selling of votes in a committee,
which assumes a competitive market for votes (Philipson and Snyder (1996), Casella,
Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012)). In these models committee members have the op-
portunity to buy and sell votes at posted prices, also acting simultaneously. Instead, we
assume that parties are matched in bilateral negotiations, and can oﬀer to buy or sell
their votes to one another at a price they negotiate, while being forward looking about
the implications of their trades on subsequent negotiations and policy outcomes.
We consider a model with three parties, which bargain over policy and rents in an inﬁnite
horizon. In each period before a policy is implemented, two parties meet one-on-one
according to a stochastic matching process, and can oﬀer to buy or sell their votes to one
another in exchange for rents.3 As in Gul (1989), parties selling their votes relinquish their
voting rights to the buyers and are excluded from further negotiations. Here, however, the
good exchanged (voting rights) does not produce payoﬀs directly, but only to the extent
that it allows its holder to change policy.
3More precisely, we assume, as in Krishna and Serrano (1996), that parties make oﬀers to sell or
purchase the right to represent the accepting player in any future negotiations.
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While in this context no party has private information or superior commitment power, we
show that the emergence of a political intermediary is a robust equilibrium phenomenon.
Our approach is to pose this problem as one of rationalizability of a broker equilibrium:
a Markov Perfect equilibrium in which one of the parties (B) becomes a broker of a deal
between two other parties, A and C, by which A transfers voting power to C via the
broker. In particular, we ask whether for given matching parameters (discount factor and
matching probabilities), there exist preference proﬁles for which we can support a broker
equilibrium. A key advantage of this formulation is that the equilibrium conditions can
be written as a set of linear inequalities Λu ≤ α, where the unknowns are the payoﬀs
ui(zj) of party i for implementing policy zj, and Λ is a matrix of matching parameters.
We can then use basic duality results from convex analysis (Farkas’ Lemma) to obtain
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a solution to this problem.
Our results show that the triangulation of political agreements implemented by the broker
equilibrium can impact outcomes and welfare, and yield a host of empirical implications
(we expand on both sets of results in the conclusions). At a broad level, however, the
main result of the paper is to explain the role of middlemen in legislative bargaining and
how this diﬀers from what we know about middlemen in exchange economies.
In exchange economies with private goods and no externalities, intermediaries can only
beneﬁt from mediation by making a monetary proﬁt. Their ability to generate this proﬁt
must then come from some initial advantage they are endowed with. The intermediary can
be the only link between the buyer and the seller (Spulber (1996a), Spulber (1996b), Rust
and Hall (2003)), it can exploit economies of scale in the use of a monitoring technology
(Biglaiser (1993), Li (1998)), it can reduce the cost of matching/search (Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1987), Yavas¸ (1992), Gehrig (1993)), or it can have an advantageous position
in a network and a low valuation for the good (Condorelli, Galeotti, and Renou (2015)).
With public decisions, instead, the broker cares about the ﬁnal policy outcome, and thus
about the identity of the party buying votes. This introduces two substantial changes in
the nature of mediation.
First, the political broker has to be trusted to (i.e., has to have incentives to) carry out
the mediated transaction. In particular, the party selling its votes to the broker must an-
ticipate that once the broker is in a position of power, it will keep on negotiating, and will
not use this power to implement its preferred policy. This condition arises endogenously
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in equilibrium for appropriate preferences and matching parameters, and does not require
endowing the broker with a diﬀerential advantage or a superior commitment ability.
Second, because the political broker cares about policy outcomes, it can get part of its
retribution in policy gains. In fact, we show that in order to be able to fulﬁll this role,
the broker must have a stake in the policy outcome. In particular, the broker must prefer
the ﬁnal policy outcome to both the status quo and the preferred policy of the party
whom he initially transacts with. Because of this, the initial seller can extract rents from
the broker to partially ﬁnance the trade. The political broker, hence, is not a two-sided
platform that can charge both sides for its services, but an agent who derives surplus from
facilitating a beneﬁcial policy change.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the literature in Section 2 and
present the model in Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze the ﬁnal bargaining stage, in
which only two parties control voting rights. In Section 5 we present our main results.
We begin with the case of a dominant majority party in Section 5.1, and extend the
analysis to all initial vote allocations and dominance relations in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Section 6 concludes. The proofs of the main results are in the Appendix. All other proofs
can be found in online appendices A and B accompanying this paper.
2 Related Literature
In this paper, we build on Gul (1989) to write down a simple model of decentralized
political bargaining that bridges models of legislative bargaining and competitive market
for votes.
The dominant approach to study bargaining in collective bodies follows the seminal paper
by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), with a heavy emphasis on bargaining over distribution.
The closest paper to ours is Jackson and Moselle (2002), where the policy space consists
of both an ideological dimension over which legislators have single peaked preferences,
and a purely distributive dimension. In this environment, Jackson and Moselle show that
the policy outcome will generally not consist of a median decision on policy together
with some distribution of spending.4 All papers in the Baron-Ferejohn tradition are
4Banks and Duggan (2000) establishes existence of stationary equilibria in a generalized version of
the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model that includes public decisions with transfers. For unidimensional
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models of centralized bargaining, where a proposer makes an oﬀer to all members of a
coalition simultaneously. We depart from this assumption because it fails to capture
the decentralized sequential bargaining process that we see as fundamental to backroom
political deals, and rule out intermediaries by ﬁat.
The prevailing approach to study decentralized bargaining in committees is to model
exchanges as occurring in a competitive market for votes (Philipson and Snyder (1996),
Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012)). The analysis of vote trading diﬀers from
that of a typical exchange economy because vote buying has externalities on non-traders
(Riker and Brams (1973), Philipson and Snyder (1996)). Because of these externalities on
non-traders and the discontinuity in payoﬀs associated with majority rule, existence of an
equilibrium is not a trivial problem. To address this issue, both papers use rationing rules
and stochastic elements (randomly choosing among suppliers when there is excess supply
in Philipson and Snyder (1996); allowing mixed demands in Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and
Palfrey (2012)). While modeling decentralized trading, the models of competitive markets
for votes do not allow sequential transactions, and as a result, also rule out intermediaries
by default. The price-taking assumption, moreover, can be restrictive in this setup.
Instead, we assume that parties are matched in bilateral negotiations, and can oﬀer to buy
or sell their votes to one another at a price they negotiate, while being forward looking
about the implications of their trades on subsequent negotiations and policy outcomes.5
Our model of decentralized bargaining builds on Gul (1989). The key diﬀerence in our
model is that agents bargain over a public decision. This introduces externalities on non-
traders, which Gul (1989) does not allow. Gul shows that given a condition on payoﬀs
that guarantees that value functions are superadditive, then as bargaining frictions vanish
there is a unique eﬃcient equilibrium, and players’ equilibrium payoﬀs converge to the
Shapley value (under uniform matching). This assumption is not satisﬁed in our model
of bargaining over public decisions, and neither is the result on eﬃciency of equilibria as
the time between oﬀers goes to zero (See Section 5.1.1).
policy space, they show that as δ → 1 the equilibrium outcomes converge to the ideal point of the median
voter, providing a noncooperative foundation of Black’s median voter theorem. (Note that this result
does not apply to bargaining over public decisions with transfers).
5In our model vote trading is done internally, by members of the committee. This complements the
literature on vote buying of inside members by outsiders (Myerson (1993), Dixit and Londregan (1996),
Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Dal Bo (2007), Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky
(2008, 2009), and Iaryczower and Oliveros (2015)). Importantly, in these models vote buyers are precluded
from forming coalitions among them, or from reselling their votes to members of the committee.
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Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1999, 2001), Gomes (2005), and Gomes and Jehiel (2005)
study non-cooperative coalitional bargaining games with externalities. These papers
address several general properties of equilibria for games with an arbitrary number of
players (existence, eﬃciency, uniqueness), but generally do not provide a more detailed
characterization of equilibrium behavior. A central assumption in this literature is that
coalition members play cooperatively within the coalition, but that coalitions play non-
cooperatively against other coalitions (see Ray and Vohra (2013)).6 In our model, instead,
we assume that a party i buying votes from j has full control of the votes of i and j, and
therefore does not necessarily choose transactions that maximize the payoﬀs of {i, j}.
Our paper also relates to the literature on intermediaries. In addition to the work on
middlemen in exchange economies that we pointed to in the Introduction, there is also a
literature on middlemen in cheap talk games, which is more distant from our paper. This
literature shows that by adding noise, randomizing over recommendations or collapsing
information a mediator can, under some conditions, improve the eﬃciency of the inter-
action between a sender and a receiver with conﬂicts of interests (see for example Ivanov
(2010), Goltsman, Ho¨rner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009), Ho¨rner, Morelli, and Squintani
(2015)).
3 The Model
There are three parties, i ∈ N = {A,B,C}, and an inﬁnite number of periods, τ =
1, 2, . . .. Each party i ∈ N has an ideal policy zi ∈ X, a discount factor δ, and is endowed
with ki > 0 votes.
7 The vector k ≡ (kA, kB, kC) denotes a generic vote allocation. Parties
participate in a process of bilateral transactions to enact a policy. Let Nτ denote the
set of parties holding voting rights in period τ . In each period τ in which at least two
parties hold voting rights, two parties i, j ∈ Nτ are randomly matched to negotiate with
one another, and one of them is randomly selected to make an oﬀer. We let ρij and pij
denote the probability that i and j are matched and i is selected to make an oﬀer when
6As it is the case in this paper, most papers in this literature assume that agreements are binding.
For exceptions, see Seidmann and Winter (1998) (in games with no externalities) and Gomes and Jehiel
(2005), or Gomes (2005) (in games with externalities).
7Later on we deﬁne formally the role of broker, which will be endogenously taken up by one of the
parties in equilibrium. All of our results hold unchanged if the party acting as broker has no initial voting
power (see our remark in the Concluding Section).
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Nτ = {i, j} and Nτ = N respectively.
The proposer i can oﬀer to buy or sell voting rights, or choose not to make an oﬀer. A
feasible transaction is an exchange of a party’s voting rights for rents. If i sells its votes
to j, i votes as instructed by j, and is excluded from further negotiations. We let tij(k)
denote the net transfer from i to j that follows a deal when i and j are matched and i
proposed to j given voting rights k. We say that i makes a relevant oﬀer to j when i
makes an oﬀer to j that j will accept. In any period τ in which a party i has a majority
of the votes after trade (k′i ≥ r ≡
∑
i ki/2), party i can choose whether to implement
its preferred policy zi or extend negotiations. When a party chooses to implement its
preferred policy, the game ends immediately and the policy zi is implemented forever. In
any period τ prior to the implementation of a new policy, the outcome is the status quo
Q. Party i’s preferences are represented by the utility function
Vi =
∞∑
τ=0
δτ [(1− δ)ui(yτ )− tτi ] ,
where yτ denotes the policy implemented in period τ , and t
τ
i denotes the τ period net
transfer from i to others. The function ui(·) is uniquely maximized at zi. We normalize
ui(Q) = 0 for all i and let u
∗
i ≡ ui(zi). We say that i dominates j (i  j) if i’s willingness
to pay for implementing zi instead of zj exceeds j’s willingness to pay for implementing zj
instead of zi; i.e., if u
∗
i − ui(zj) ≥ u∗j − uj(zi). Equivalently, letting Sij(y) ≡ ui(y) + uj(y)
denote the aggregate surplus for i and j of implementing a policy y, we say that i  j if
Sij(zi) > Sij(zj).
An equilibrium is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). A trading state is a pair ((i, j),k),
where (i, j) denotes that i is matched with j and i is selected to propose, and k denotes
the pre-trade allocation of voting rights. We let W iij(k, buy) and W
i
ij(k, sell) denote i’s
equilibrium payoﬀ from her best relevant buy and sell oﬀers in trading state ((i, j),k),
and W iij(k, wait) i’s equilibrium payoﬀ from not making a relevant oﬀer. Then W
i
ij(k) ≡
maxaW
i
ij(k, a), for a ∈ {buy, sell, wait}, denotes i’s equilibrium payoﬀ in trading state
((i, j),k). We also let W i(k) ≡ E[W iij(k)], where the expectation is taken over all possible
realizations of matches and proposing power. Finally, because a party with a majority of
the votes after trading can choose to implement its preferred policy or extend negotiations,
we also need to consider i’s post-trade equilibrium payoﬀ after trade opportunities resulted
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in a vote endowment k, which we denote by wi(k).
4 Majority-Minority Bargaining
We begin by analyzing the ﬁnal bargaining stage, in which only two parties, say B and C,
control voting rights (see Figure 1). Because of simple majority rule, one of these parties,
say B, has a majority of the votes; i.e. k = (0, kB, kC), with kB > kC . We call B the
majority party and C the minority party.
Buy oer Sell oer
tbc
N
Nature
(B,C) (C,B)
B1
Y
zB implemented
B2
Bilateral Bargaining 
between B and C in t+1
Y
zC implemented
B3
Bilateral Bargaining 
between B and C in t+1
N
tbc
zB implementedzB implemented
Figure 1: Bilateral Bargaining. Here B is assumed to be the majority party, C the minority.
The ﬁgure illustrates the full sequence of play if B is selected to propose (state (B,C)). B makes
a buy or a sell oﬀer (node B1), which C can accept (Y) or reject (N). If C rejects, B decides
whether to implement its preferred policy or extends negotiations (nodes B2 and B3).
Equilibrium behavior in the majority-minority bargaining game relies on two key factors.
The ﬁrst is parties’ relative intensity of preferences for the majority and minority policies
zB and zC . This part of this analysis is standard. When B  C, total surplus is higher
if the majority alternative is implemented. As a result, there is no transfer that C would
be willing to oﬀer that would compensate B for not implementing its preferred policy zB.
In this case, there is a MPE in which there is no trade and B implements its preferred
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policy.8
When instead C  B, there are gains from trade. Whether these gains from trade
are realized, and if so how they are distributed, depends on parties’ perception of their
relative bargaining power. The key factor here is that B has the option to implement
its preferred policy without C’s consent. Diﬀerently to a standard bilateral bargaining
game (where negotiations are automatically extended after disagreement), the majority
party can either reject an oﬀer and extend negotiations, in which case wj(k) = δW j(k),
or reject the oﬀer and implement its preferred policy, in which case wj(k) = uj(zB). The
threat of implementing its preferred policy after disagreement, however, is not always
credible. In fact, B has incentives to implement its preferred policy after disagreement
only if u∗B ≥ δWB(k), and otherwise prefers to extend negotiations for an additional
period.9
This oﬀ-equilibrium-path choice has important consequences for equilibrium behavior and
the distribution of rents in majority-minority bargaining. Consider the problem of the
majority party when it has an opportunity to propose. B can buy or sell votes to C,
generating payoﬀs SBC(zB)− wC(k) and SBC(zC)− wC(k) respectively, or it can choose
not to make C a relevant oﬀer, yielding wB(k). The key here is that B’s payoﬀs for
waiting and trading votes depend on the reservation values wB(k) and wC(k), which in
turn depend on whether B prefers to implement its preferred policy or extend negotiations
after disagreement.
Given equilibrium beliefs about play after disagreement we can characterize parties’ op-
timal actions in each decision node as a function of the continuation values, and then
equilibria of the majority-minority bargaining game.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose at time τ two parties, i and j, have voting rights, where ki > kj
8 If in addition u∗B < δ ρBF SBC(zB), there also exists a MPE in which C pays B so that it implements
zB immediately. In this equilibrium B oﬀers to buy from C at a negative price (or accepts only a negative
price oﬀer), threatening C with maintaining the status quo after disagreement. This is interesting in itself,
but largely irrelevant for our main argument, with the exception of the uniqueness claim in Theorem 5.4.
We return to this point in the proof of this theorem.
9This is similar to bargaining games with outside options (see for example Muthoo (1999)). However,
in bargaining games with outside options it is assumed that the party receiving the oﬀer can reject the
oﬀer and take her outside option. This counterbalances the proposal power of the other party. In our
game, instead, it is only the majority party who can implement its preferred policy after disagreement,
independently of whether it is the proposer or the receiver of the oﬀer. This diﬀerence in the sequence
introduces relatively large changes in the equilibrium of the game.
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but j  i. Then there exists a MPE in which, independently of who has the opportunity
to propose, j buys i’s votes and implements its preferred policy zj. The majority party i
extends negotiations after disagreement with probability one if and only if u∗i ≤ δρijSij(zj).
Proposition 4.1 follows immediately from Proposition 7.2 in the Appendix, which charac-
terizes the equilibrium of the majority-minority bargaining game in more detail.10 A key
takeaway from Proposition 4.1 is that conjectures of equilibrium play after disagreement
are fundamental for the analysis of equilibria with intermediaries. If the joint payoﬀ of
implementing the minority policy is not large enough, or the majority can’t appropriate a
large fraction of this surplus (δ ρBC SBC(zC) < u
∗
B), the majority implements its preferred
policy after disagreement with positive probability, and in equilibrium u∗B ≥ δWB(k).
But in this case the majority-minority bargaining node wouldn’t be reached in the ﬁrst
place. This is because the decision problem of the majority party after disagreement in
bilateral bargaining is strategically equivalent to its decision problem after acquiring the
majority when all parties have voting rights. It follows that a necessary condition for the
existence of an equilibrium with intermediaries is that the broker’s relevant threat after
disagreement in the majority-minority bargaining game is not to implement its preferred
policy, and hence that u∗B ≤ δ ρBC SBC(zC).
5 Intermediaries in Legislative Bargaining
In this section we present our main results. We establish the existence of MPE in which
one of the parties serves as a legislative intermediary for an open, non-empty, and fully
dimensional subset of matching parameters and preference proﬁles. We then discuss the
implications of this result for welfare and policy outcomes, and characterize conditions on
preference proﬁles under which an equilibrium with mediated trade can arise.
From here on, we refer to the stage in which all parties have uncommitted voting rights
as the decentralized bargaining stage (see Figure 2). We refer to equilibria with mediated
trade as broker equilibria. In a broker equilibrium, a party i buys votes from party
10As Proposition 7.2 makes clear, establishing existence of equilibrium in the majority-minority bar-
gaining game requires using mixed strategies. This is because the majority’s option to extend negotia-
tions or implement its preferred policy after disagreement creates a discontinuity in payoﬀs that leads to
nonexistence of a MPE in pure strategies. Mixing after disagreement smoothes out this discontinuity in
equilibrium payoﬀs and restores existence.
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j in decentralized bargaining only to sell its votes to party  	= i, j in majority-minority
bargaining. In addition to this core feature, we impose two additional requirements. First,
to assure that the broker is not merely replicating indirectly a trade that would also occur
directly, we require that parties j and  do not trade when they meet in decentralized
bargaining. Second, we ask that the trade enabled by the broker occurs on the equilibrium
path independently of the realization of meetings. This requires that party  does not
trade with i or j in decentralized bargaining, and that if a party initially has a majority
of the votes, that party extends negotiations after disagreement in any bilateral meeting.
Buy oer Sell oer
Nature
(i,j)
i1
tij
N
Y Y
M3
N
tij
zM implemented
M2
Decentralized 
Bargaining in t+1
zM implemented
M1
Bilateral Bargaining 
between i and r in t+1
zM implemented
M4
Bilateral Bargaining 
between j and r in t+1
zM implemented
Decentralized 
Bargaining in t+1
Figure 2: Decentralized Bargaining: In each decision nodeMk, the partyM ∈ {A,B,C, ∅}
with a majority of the votes decides whether to implement its preferred policy zM or extend
negotiations. If M = ∅, negotiations are extended by default.
Deﬁnition 5.1 A strategy proﬁle σ is a broker equilibrium if (i) σ is a MPE, and (ii) there
is a party i and a party j such that (ii.a) i buys j’s votes in any trading meeting ((i, j),k)
in decentralized bargaining and sells its votes to  	= i, j in majority-minority bargaining,
(ii.b) there is no trade in decentralized bargaining in nodes ((j, ),k) or ((i, ),k), and
(ii.c) if km ≥ r for some m ∈ {i, j, }, then m extends negotiations after disagreement in
decentralized bargaining.
We organize our analysis in two parts. In Section 5.1 we develop our analysis of broker
equilibria with a dominant majority party A; i.e., we let kA ≥ r and assume that A  B
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and A  C. (We then ﬁx C  B without loss of generality.) Doing this allows us to
simplify the discussion considerably. We then present general results for all dominance
relations and initial vote allocations in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
The analysis of broker equilibria with a dominant majority party is particularly interest-
ing for two reasons. First, since kA ≥ r, the existence of a broker equilibrium can be
surprising, because A has the power to implement her preferred policy without engaging
in negotiations with other parties, or incurring any delay. Moreover, the fact that A is a
dominant majority party implies that in two-party bargaining with either B or C, A would
implement her preferred policy without trading (see Proposition 7.2). Thus, whenever it
exists, a broker equilibrium enables a trade that would not have occurred in the absence
of the third party, causing a change in policy outcomes.
5.1 Broker Equilibrium with a Dominant Majority Party
In this section, we analyze broker equilibria with a dominant majority party; i.e., we let
kA ≥ r and ﬁx the dominance relation (A  C,C  B,A  B).11 Given the equilibrium
in section 4, a necessary condition for trade in the continuation is that the party who
has a majority of the votes in majority-minority bargaining is dominated by the minority
party. Since A is dominant, this excludes the cases in which B sells to/buys from C in
decentralized bargaining, and similarly excludes the cases in which A acts as a broker.
Thus, the only possible broker equilibrium with a dominant majority party A is one in
which B acts as a broker, so that A sells to B in decentralized bargaining, and B sells to
C in the majority-minority bargaining stage.
Implementing a broker equilibrium introduces equilibrium incentive constraints. First,
having the majority of the votes, A must have incentives to extend negotiations after
disagreement in decentralized bargaining; i.e.
u∗A ≤ δWA(k) (1)
Second, after buying A out in decentralized bargaining, B has to prefer to wait in order
to broker a deal with C rather than implementing its preferred policy right away. As
11The discussion in this section is relatively informal to favor intuition. Equilibrium conditions (1)-(6)
follow from Propositions B.2 and B.3. in Online Appendix B.
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we discussed in Section 4, this is in fact the same strategic problem faced by B after
disagreement in the majority-minority bargaining game with C. Thus after B acquires
the majority from A in decentralized bargaining, it will extend negotiations if and only if
C  B (as we are assuming throughout) and
u∗B ≤ δ ρBC SBC(zC) (2)
The remaining equilibrium conditions come from parties’ best responses in each trading
node. First, whenever A and B meet, A has to be willing to sell its votes to B at a price
B is willing to accept. Given C  B and condition (2), we know that if B were to buy
A’s votes, it would go on to broker a deal with C. Thus if A were to sell to B, it could
appropriate their joint value Π(AB,C) ≡ δ[uA(zC) + ρBCSBC(zC)] from transferring all
voting rights to B and letting it negotiate the sale of their votes to C, net of B’s discounted
continuation payoﬀ δWB(k). If instead A were to buy B’s votes, A could only appropriate
their joint surplus from implementing its own preferred policy, SAB(zA) (again, net of B’s
discounted continuation payoﬀ δWB(k)). This is because given A  C, there are no gains
from trade between A and C in majority-minority bargaining. Thus A prefers selling to
buying from B if and only if
SAB(zA) ≤ Π(AB,C), (3)
and prefers selling to B rather than extending negotiations if and only if
δ [WA(k) +WB(k)] ≤ Π(AB,C). (4)
Second, when A and C meet, the broker equilibrium requires that they do not trade.
Now, given that A  B and C  B, neither A nor C has a further gain from trading
with B in majority-minority bargaining. Thus WAAC(k; buy) = SAC(zA) − δWC(k) and
WAAC(k; sell) = SAC(zC) − δWC(k). And since A  C, it follows that A would rather
buy than sell to C. Moreover, A prefers to extend negotiations rather than making C
a relevant buy oﬀer if and only if A and C’s aggregate discounted continuation value is
larger than their joint payoﬀ of implementing zA, i.e.,
SAC(zA) ≤ δ [WA(k) +WC(k)]. (5)
Finally, the broker equilibrium requires that C and B choose not to trade when they meet
13
in decentralized bargaining. But given A  B and A  C, the analysis is similar to the
case above. Here A implements its preferred policy immediately after either C sells to
B or after B sells to C, but extends negotiations if B and C fail to reach an agreement.
Then WCCB(k; sell) = W
C
CB(k; buy) = SCB(zA) − δWB(k), and C prefers not to make a
relevant oﬀer than to sell or buy from B if and only if
SBC(zA) ≤ δ [WB(k) +WC(k)]. (6)
Conditions (1)-(6) are necessary and suﬃcient for a broker equilibrium, given the con-
tinuation values. Continuation values, in turn, are determined by equilibrium strategies,
and can be easily computed for a broker equilibrium.
Lemma 5.2 Consider a MPE in which party B brokers a deal between A and C. Then
WC(k) =
δ (pAB + pBA) ρCB SBC(zC)
(1− δ) + δ(pAB + pBA) ,
WA(k) =
pAB Π(AB,C)
(1− δ) + δ(pAB + pBA) and W
B(k) =
pBAΠ(AB,C)
(1− δ) + δ(pAB + pBA)
Note in particular that A’s share in the joint equilibrium payoﬀ of A and B, WA/(WA +
WB), is given by the conditional probability that A proposes to B whenever A and B
meet in decentralized bargaining, pAB/(pAB + pBA). Moreover, C’s equilibrium payoﬀ
relative to the joint equilibrium payoﬀ of A and B is increasing in the probability that C
can propose to B in majority-minority bargaining, ρCB, and in the ratio uB(zC)/uA(zC).
Substituting the values from Lemma 5.2 in the equilibrium conditions (1)-(6) we obtain
a homogeneous system of inequalities that is linear in the payoﬀs ui(zj) (see (1b)-(6b)
in Lemma 7.3 in the Appendix). Since this is a homogeneous system, it has a solution
when all parties are indiﬀerent between all alternatives, i.e., ui(zj) = 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
However, we want to know if there can be a broker equilibrium when each party has a
strict preference for its own ideal policy. Formally, we ask that u ∈ U , where
U ≡ {u ∈ R9 : −u∗i < 0,−u∗i + ui(zj) < 0 ∀i = A,B,C, j 	= i}
The system (1b)-(6b), together with the requirement that u ∈ U , and the dominance
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relations (A  C  B,A  B), still form a system of linear inequalities in the unknowns
ui(zj), which can be written as Λu ≤ α for a matrix of coeﬃcients Λ, where
uT =
(
u∗A uC(zA) uB(zA) uA(zC) u
∗
C uB(zC) uA(zB) uC(zB) u
∗
B
)
, α ≡
[
09
b9
]
for some b > 0, and Λ is an m × 9 matrix whose elements are functions of the matching
parameters ω ≡ (p, ρ, δ) ∈ Ω. Thus, proving that there exists u ∈ U that admits a broker
equilibrium boils down to proving that the system of linear inequalities Λu ≤ α has a
solution. At this point, the following result, known as Farkas’ Lemma (see Rockafellar
(1970), Theorem 22.1), is useful:
Lemma 5.3 (Farkas’ Lemma) Let Λ be an m×n matrix, and α ∈ Rm. Then one and
only one of the following alternatives holds:
1. There exists a vector u ∈ Rn, such that Λu ≤ α, or
2. There exists a non-negative vector λ ∈ Rm such that λTΛ = 0 and λTα < 0.
Lemma 5.3 is useful because showing that the linear system of equalities λTΛ = 0n does
not have a nonnegative solution λ ∈ Rm such that λTα < 0 is considerably simpler
(algebraically) than proving that the system of linear inequalities Λu ≤ α has a solution.
With this simpliﬁcation, we can prove our ﬁrst main result. For convenience, we deﬁne
υ ≡ (1− δ) + δ(pAB + pBA), θ ≡ pAB + pBAρCB, μ ≡ pBA + pABρCB
Theorem 5.4 Suppose there is a dominant majority party A. For any ω ∈ Ω, there
exists a compact set of preference proﬁles Uω ⊂ U such that for any u ∈ Uω, the legislative
bargaining game with parameters (ω, u) admits a broker equilibrium if and only if ω ∈
Ω∗ ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : (1− δ ρBC) υ ≤ δ2 θ}.
Note that increasing ρBC expands Ω
∗, and thus broadens the conditions under which there
is a broker equilibrium. The intuition is as follows. Increasing the likelihood that the
broker has agenda setting power in majority-minority bargaining has the direct eﬀect of
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increasing its bargaining power, and therefore the share of the surplus it can obtain when
negotiating with the ultimate buyer. As a result, B is now more inclined to negotiate
with C instead of implementing its preferred policy after obtaining A’s votes, in line
with equilibrium. Increasing ρBC also has indirect eﬀects on bargaining incentives in
decentralized bargaining. In particular, since B is now more able to extract surplus from
C, reaching the majority minority stage is not as desirable for C (5b-6b). The condition
(1−δ ρBC) υ ≤ δ2 θ, characterizing Ω∗, therefore says that the tightening of the constraints
(5b) and (6b) (the indirect eﬀect), never overpowers the loosening of the constraints (1b)-
(4b) (the direct eﬀect).
Reducing bargaining frictions also unambiguously expands the conditions under which
there is a broker equilibrium. In fact, increasing δ not only expands Ω∗, but also weakly re-
laxes each of the equilibrium constraints (1b)-(6b).12 In fact, the condition (1−δ ρBC) υ ≤
δ2 θ is always satisﬁed in the limit as δ → 1. Thus, as bargaining frictions vanish, there
is always a preference proﬁle for which there is a broker equilibrium; i.e.,
lim
δ→1
Ω∗ = Ω.
This result has two implications. First, it shows that the existence of broker equilibria
does not require that A and C have few opportunities to trade. It also shows that with
no bargaining frictions, no matching environment can be ruled out as incompatible with
brokers; i.e., that it is not possible to ﬁnd necessary conditions for the existence of a
broker equilibrium by looking only at the matching environment.
The next two results address two immediate possible concerns regarding Theorem 5.4.
A ﬁrst possible concern is that the conditions for existence of a broker equilibrium are
knife-edge. Proposition 5.5 shows that this is not the case.
Proposition 5.5 For every ω ∈ int(Ω∗) 	= ∅, there is an open subset P ⊂ Ω∗ containing
ω, and an open subset V ⊂ U , such that for any (ω′, u) ∈ P × V , (ω′, u) admits a broker
equilibrium.
A second possible concern is that the result in Theorem 5.4 might be a curiosity arising
12As we discuss in Section 5.1.2, this is due to the fact that the value of the transfers between players
increases as bargaining frictions vanish.
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from a large multiplicity of equilibria in which everything goes. Proposition 5.6 shows
that this is not the case either.
Proposition 5.6 Suppose there is a dominant majority party and ω ∈ Ω∗, then whenever
a broker equilibrium exists, (1) it is the unique equilibrium in which zC is the policy
outcome, and (2) there is no equilibrium in which zB is the policy outcome. Moreover,
(3) there exists a nonempty subset of parameters O ⊂ Ω∗ such that for any ω ∈ O there
exists u in compact set of preference proﬁles Uω ⊂ U such that the broker equilibrium is
the unique pure strategy MPE of the legislative bargaining game with parameters (ω, u).
5.1.1 Outcomes and Welfare
As we discussed earlier, the case of a dominant majority party is interesting because A
would not trade with B if C were not present, and similarly A would not trade with C if
B were not present. Thus, in this counterfactual comparison across games, the presence
of the broker unambiguously changes policy outcomes vis-a`-vis a two-party legislature.
Furthermore, we have deﬁned broker equilibria so that A and C do not trade directly
when they meet. Thus in this equilibrium the broker is creating a trade that would not
occur without it. In addition, Proposition 5.6 establishes that there is no equilibrium in
which A and C trade directly. We conclude that the broker is creating a trade that would
not have occurred without it, in this or any other equilibrium.
The fact that brokers enable transactions that wouldn’t have occurred in their absence
does not imply that A and C are better oﬀ with than without brokers. Note that the
values of the game in which only A and C are present are given by WˆA (k) = u∗A and
WˆC (k) = uC (zA). Since in a broker equilibrium u
∗
A < δW
A (k), it is immediate to
verify that the majority party beneﬁts from the existence of the broker. However, from
Lemma 5.2, ΔWC(k) = (δ/υ) (pAB + pBA) ρCB SBC(zC) − uC (zA), which in general can
be positive or negative. Thus the ultimate buyer might prefer that no trades were set in
motion in the ﬁrst place.
In fact, the broker equilibrium is not generally eﬃcient, even as frictions vanish. Suppose
ﬁrst that δ < 1. Note that in all strategy proﬁles in which the majority-minority game is
reached, one of the players meets all others. Thus, in any such strategy proﬁle, we can
always transfer rents from any player to any other player, and eﬃciency coincides with
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maximizing aggregate policy payoﬀs. But then the individual payoﬀs of all players can be
improved from what they obtain in a broker equilibrium if A cedes its votes to C whenever
they meet in decentralized bargaining (this reduces delay). Now, in the limit with δ → 1,
it is still possible that equilibrium payoﬀs approach eﬃciency. We show however that this
is not the case generically. Note that from Lemma 5.2, parties’ aggregate welfare in an
equilibrium with brokers is given by
∑
i
W i(k) =
(
δ(pAB + pBA)
(1− δ) + δ(pAB + pBA)
)∑
i
ui(zC)
so that
∑
W i(k) → uA(zC)+u∗C +uB(zC) as δ → 1. It is then enough to show that there
is a preference proﬁle u ∈ U with the property that ∑i ui(zC) <∑i ui(zB) admitting an
equilibrium with brokers with δ → 1. It can be veriﬁed that this happens for example
with the preferences of Table 1, given uniform matching.
Party/Policy zA zB zC Q
A 10 0 -485 0
B 10 20 10 0
C 505 990 1000 0
Table 1: A Preference Proﬁle admitting an Ineﬃcient Equilibrium with Brokers with
uniform matching and δ → 1.
On the other hand, broker equilibria are always welfare improving : for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
conditions (1b) and (6b) imply that in any broker equilibrium with a dominant majority
party A,
∑
i[W
i (k)− ui (zA)] > 0.
The possible ineﬃciency of equilibria in our model contrasts with the result in Gul (1989),
which establishes eﬃciency for δ → 1. However, it is aligned with similar results in the
literature on non-cooperative coalitional bargaining games with externalities, in which
ineﬃciency is a robust phenomenon (Ray and Vohra (2013)).
5.1.2 The Role of the Broker
Theorem 5.4 shows that under a broad set of conditions, there exists an equilibrium with
brokers. The theorem, however, is silent about the preference proﬁles under which brokers
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can emerge in equilibrium. Thus, it is still possible that these preference proﬁles are in
some sense exceptional, and not likely to arise in applications. In this section we show
that this is not the case. We also establish properties of the broker and the environment
under which brokers emerge in equilibrium.13
Does the existence of brokers relies in some way on pathological preference proﬁles? To
address this question, we ask whether a broker equilibrium can be consistent with the
standard notion of ‘well-behaved’ preferences: the class of single-peaked preference pro-
ﬁles, USP . Our next Proposition states this result.
Proposition 5.7 Suppose there exists a dominant majority party A. Let Ω∗∗ ≡ {ω ∈
Ω : (1 − δρBC)υ < δ2min{θ, μ}}. Then for any ω ∈ Ω∗∗, there exists a compact set
Uω ⊂ USP such that all u ∈ Uω, the legislative bargaining game with parameters (ω, u)
admits a broker equilibrium.
In fact, linear and quadratic payoﬀs are also admissible. Figure 5.1.2 illustrates this in
the quadratic payoﬀ case. To maintain the normalization that ui(Q) = 0, we write i’s
payoﬀ function as ui(x) = −βi(x − zi)2 + βi(Q − zi)2 in the case of the quadratic utility
function, and similarly for the linear payoﬀs. Note that here the condition i  j boils
down to βi > βj. Thus, in these examples we must have βC > βB. This must be the
case, because in a broker equilibrium C (the ﬁnal buyer) has to dominate the broker so
that there is a ﬁnal transaction. In addition to this, in the example in the ﬁgure we have
uB(zC) ≥ uB(zA) and uB(zC) ≥ uB(Q), which in this context imply that the broker’s
ideal policy zB must be closer to zC than to both zA and the status quo Q. Thus, if for
example zC < zA < Q, as in the ﬁgure, the broker’s preferred policy cannot be to the
right of that of the majority party. This result extends beyond the example, and in fact
beyond the class of single-peaked preference proﬁles, to all preference proﬁles that are
consistent with a broker equilibrium.
Proposition 5.8 Suppose there is a broker equilibrium with a dominant majority party A.
Then the broker directly beneﬁts from policy change; i.e., prefers the policy implemented
13To obtain these results, we further exploit the duality results from convex analysis, transforming
restrictions on preference proﬁles into a modiﬁed matrix Λ′ of matching parameters, and obtaining con-
ditions for existence of a solution to the underlying system of inequalities following the same steps as in
Theorem 5.4. The algebraic derivations are relegated to Online Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Quadratic utility functions admitting an equilibrium with brokers. Here ρ23 =
0.2, and p is uniform. δ = 0.95. βA = 25, βB = 15 and βC = 20.
in equilibrium to the status quo, uB(zC) > uB(Q), and to the ideal policy of the majority
party, uB(zC) > uB(zA).
Proposition 5.8 shows that in order to have an equilibrium with brokers, the party acting
as broker must have a stake in the policy outcome.
Corollary 5.9 Suppose that there is a dominant majority party A, and consider any
matching parameters ω ∈ Ω and preference proﬁle u ∈ U . If uB(x) = uB ∈ R for all
x ∈ X, the game with parameters (ω, u) does not admit a broker equilibrium.
The result of Proposition 5.8, however, goes well beyond this. Since the broker must
prefer implementing zC to the status quo, its presence increases the aggregate surplus of
implementing zC relative to inaction. In addition, Proposition 5.8 shows that the broker
must also prefer implementing zC to zA. As a result, whenever there is a broker equilib-
rium, the broker must also increase the aggregate surplus of implementing zC relative to
the majority policy.
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Who appropriates these policy gains? To address this question, we decouple the equilib-
rium payoﬀ W i of each party i into two components: a policy value PVi capturing the
payoﬀ attributable to policy, and an expected transfer Ti. In a broker equilibrium where
B transfers votes from A to C, the policy value PVi of player i is δui(zC) with probability
(pAB + pBA) and δPVi with probability (1− pAB − pBA). Thus
PVi =
δ(pAB + pBA)
υ
ui(zC) (7)
Given (7) and the total equilibrium payoﬀs from Lemma 5.2, we can then compute the
expected transfer to player i in this equilibrium by Ti = Wi − PVi. Doing this for the
ﬁnal buyer C, we obtain
TC = −δ (pAB + pBA)
υ
× [u∗C − ρCB SBC(zC)]
Now, condition (2b), which assures that the broker has incentives to carry the trade after
acquiring the votes from A, requires that δ ρBC SBC(zC) ≥ u∗B. But then ρBC SBC(zC) >
uB(zC), or equivalently, u
∗
C − ρCB SBC(zC) > 0. Thus, in equilibrium, the party imple-
menting its preferred policy, C, makes a positive transfer to the broker B; i.e., TC < 0.
Similarly, as we show in the proof of the next result, (2b), (5b), and A  C imply TB < 0.
Thus,
Proposition 5.10 In any broker equilibrium with a dominant majority party A, both the
broker B and the ﬁnal buyer C make ex ante positive transfers to other parties, while the
majority party A receives ex ante positive transfers from other parties.
Proposition 5.10 says that A can extract rents from both B and C. Thus, while B and C
beneﬁt from implementing zC relative to both the status quo and the preferred policy of
the majority party, zA, A is able to extract some of this policy beneﬁt from both parties.
Together, Propositions 5.8 and 5.10 highlight a fundamental diﬀerence between interme-
diaries in politics and in exchange economies. Diﬀerently to intermediaries in exchange
economies – who can only beneﬁt by making a monetary proﬁt – the legislative interme-
diary must care about policy outcomes. In fact, in equilibrium the broker is rewarded
with the prospect of a policy gain when making the initial trade with the majority party
A, and recovers some of its monetary loses in bilateral trading. Each of these parts is
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important. The ﬁrst part says that the political broker is not a two-sided platform that
can charge both sides for its services, but an agent who derives surplus from facilitating
a beneﬁcial policy change. The second part is important too, for A must anticipate that
once the broker is in a position of power it will keep on negotiating, instead of using this
power to implement its preferred policy.
Proposition 5.10 also shows that the broker will not be the sole source of compensation to
the majority party. In fact, the strategic environment must be such that the broker can
extract suﬃcient rents from the ﬁnal buyer, putting in motion a chain of rent extraction.
The point is that the broker equilibrium provides the incentives for the broker and the
ultimate buyer to compensate the majority party. It is not the only way to extract
rents from B, and in fact it is not the eﬃcient way to extract rents from B (see section
5.1.1). However, the broker is an instrument to make this transfer of resources incentive
compatible.
5.2 Arbitrary Dominances with a Majority Party
A key feature of our model is that parties bargain over public decisions, which aﬀect
the payoﬀ of all players. Because of this feature, the trade-oﬀs that parties face when
negotiating with one another in decentralized bargaining depend on their equilibrium
beliefs about the path of play following each possible trade, on and oﬀ the equilibrium
path. These equilibrium conjectures were uniquely pinned down in the case of a dominant
majority party, but will generally diﬀer across dominance relations.
Consider for example meetings between A and B. In a broker equilibrium B must buy
A’s votes, and then support C’s preferred policy in exchange for rents. Thus the joint
continuation value for A and B after A sells its votes to B is Π(AB,C). How does
this compare to the prospect of A buying B’s votes instead? In the case of a dominant
majority party, A  C by hypothesis, so when A buys votes from B it implements
its preferred policy immediately. As a result, selling to B dominates buying from B
if Π(AB,C) ≥ SAB(zA) (eq.3). However, if A is not a dominant majority party, it is
possible that C  A. Indeed, if C  A and u∗A ≤ δρACSAC(zC), then after buying B’s
votes A would have incentives to sell her votes to C in exchange for rents. In this case
the joint continuation value for A and B after A buys B’s votes is Π(BA,C) 	= SAB(zA).
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The fact that equilibrium conjectures generally diﬀer across dominance relations poses
a natural question. Is the assumption that the majority party A dominates B and C
necessary for the existence of a broker equilibrium? Is it possible that a broker equilibrium
exists even if the initial seller is dominated by the broker, the ultimate buyer, or both?
Theorem 5.11 establishes that with the exception of the brokerage condition (2), which
requires that the broker is dominated by the ultimate buyer, the restrictions on dominance
relations imposed in the dominant majority party case are not essential for the result. We
show that there are matching parameters and preferences for which a broker equilibrium
exists for each dominance relation.
Theorem 5.11 Suppose kA ≥ r and ﬁx any dominance relation . There is a set of
matching parameters Ω† ⊂ Ω such that if ω ∈ Ω†, then there exists a compact set of
preference proﬁles Uω ⊂ U such that for all u ∈ Uω, (ω, u) admits a broker equilibrium.
The proof of this result consists of several steps. First, we generalize the analysis of incen-
tives in decentralized bargaining; i.e., we characterize which trades a party would want
to carry out in each bilateral meeting, having anticipated the consequences of alternative
trades on rent and policy outcomes (Propositions B.2 and B.3).14 The resulting conditions
characterize all broker equilibria, for given continuation values (Lemma B.4). The values,
W i(k), in turn, are still determined by Lemma 5.2. Substituting, and adding the dom-
inance conditions and strict maxima conditions, we obtain, for each dominance relation
, L systems of the form Λu ≤ α,  = 1, . . . , L, characterizing the conditions on the
primitives of the model under which there is a broker equilibrium given .15
To prove the theorem, we ﬁrst show that if there is a preference proﬁle that admits brokers
when (A  C,C  B,A  B), there is one that admits brokers with (A  C,C 
B,B  A) (Proposition B.5). Thus, the suﬃcient condition for brokers in Theorem
14A key result in this direction is the eﬃciency of bilateral meetings for the parties involved in the trade.
In any meeting between two players i and j, given continuation values – and thus given the strategies of
all players, including their own future play – the outcome of the meeting between i and j is eﬃcient for
i and j (Remark B.1).
15Note that there is one way in which the dominant majority party case is special. For this dominance
relation, all equilibrium continuations are uniquely determined. As a result, substituting the values
from Lemma 5.2, the system (1)-(6) completely characterizes the set of parameters for which a broker
equilibrium exists. In general, however, oﬀ-path continuations can vary for diﬀerent parameters, even
ﬁxing the dominance relation. As a result, generally there are multiple systems of the form Λ′u ≤ α for
each possible dominance relation.
23
5.4 is also suﬃcient for brokers whenever A  C and C  B. We then extend the
existence result to the remaining dominance relations, and provide alternative conditions
under which a similar result holds when (C  B,B  A,C  A) (Proposition B.6) and
(C  A,A  B,C  B) (Proposition B.7). Due to space limitations, these proofs are
included in Online Appendix B.
5.3 A Minority Legislature
In this section we extend our analysis of political intermediation to legislatures in which
no party has a majority of the votes. Fractionalized power is a relatively common oc-
currence in legislatures across the world: in 45% of the seat distributions in presidential
democracies and 57% of seat distributions in parliamentary democracies, no party con-
trolled a majority of seats in the legislature (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004)).
In these cases, either minority parties form relatively stable policy coalitions, or policy
compromises are attained on a case-by-case basis, suggesting that political intermediation
can be particularly important in these settings. In fact, Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh
(2004) show that the absence of a majority party doesn’t aﬀect legislative success, as
measured by the proportion of government bills turned into law: single-party minority
governments are at least as successful as majority coalitions.
From a theoretical standpoint, minority legislatures introduce two new considerations.
First, since any two parties form a majority, any vote share is strategically equivalent to
one in which each party has one vote. In this context, there is no natural assignment of
parties to roles (seller, broker, ultimate buyer), and it is possible that more than one strat-
egy proﬁle is supported in equilibrium for any given dominance relation, given appropriate
parameters. Second, for a given strategy proﬁle, parties face diﬀerent incentives in decen-
tralized bargaining. When A has a majority, any trade involving A resolves in the buyer
having a majority of the votes, but any trade between the two minority parties leaves
the majority unchanged. When no party has a majority, on the other hand, any trade
between two parties resolves in the buyer having a majority of the votes, independently
of the initial distribution of voting rights.
Do these changes in the structure of the game result in any constraint on the dominance
relations  under which political intermediaries can be supported in equilibrium? Our
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next result establishes that – as in the case of a majority party – a particular conﬁguration
of dominance relations is not necessary for the existence of a broker equilibrium when
power is fractionalized. However, it also establishes restrictions on the roles that parties
can play for a given dominance relation.16
Theorem 5.12 Suppose ki < r for all i = A,B,C, and ﬁx any dominance relation .
1. There is a Ω‡ ⊂ Ω such that if ω ∈ Ω‡, then there exists a compact set of preference
proﬁles Uω ⊂ U such that for all u ∈ Uω, (ω, u) admits a broker equilibrium.
2. If  is cyclic (A  C,C  B,B  A), a broker equilibrium can occur if the initial
seller dominates or is dominated by the broker or the ultimate buyer.
3. If  is transitive, neither the broker nor the ultimate buyer can dominate the initial
seller. Thus, in a broker equilibrium the seller is the dominant party, and the broker
is a dominated party.
It follows that if we ﬁx the role parties play in a broker equilibrium, a broker equilibrium
can only exist for some conﬁgurations of the dominance relation . In particular, if the
dominance relation is transitive, only the dominant party can be the seller, and only the
dominated party can be the broker.
To see the intuition for this result, consider a broker equilibrium in which B buys votes
from A in decentralized bargaining, and then sells its votes to C. Why doesn’t B sell its
votes to C directly in decentralized bargaining? This is surprising, because we know that
both B and C give money away in this broker equilibrium. The reason why B does not
sell to C directly is that if it were to do that, C would then sell its votes to A, who would
end up implementing a policy B dislikes. Because of this, B is willing to give away rents
to avoid the anticipated policy loss. The same logic explains why it must be the case that
A  C: otherwise C would implement its preferred policy right away after buying from
B in decentralized bargaining, and B would prefer to sell its votes to C. This would upset
16Since in this case any trade between any two parties resolves in the buyer having a majority of
the votes, Proposition B.2 applies to all pairwise meetings. Thus, for any candidate equilibrium σ, the
conditions that result from applying Proposition B.2 to the trades prescribed by σ, together with the
brokerage condition (eq.2), characterize the conditions on parameters for σ to be an equilibrium. We
then prove our next result proceeding as in Section 5.2 for any given strategy proﬁle.
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the broker equilibrium.17 Now, C  B is ﬁxed by assumption. And we have just argued
that A  C. What remains to complete is either A  B or B  A. But B  A implies
that  is cyclic. Thus, if  is transitive, it must be that A  C and C  B.
5.4 Transfers
In Proposition 5.10 we showed for the case of a dominant majority party that in any broker
equilibrium the ﬁnal buyer transfers rents to the broker. Because the proof of this result
relies only on the brokerage condition (eq. 2), it applies generically, for any dominance
relation  and any initial distribution of voting rights k. The same proposition also
established – for the case of a dominant majority party – that in a broker equilibrium
the broker must be a net loser of rents in expectation. Thus, in equilibrium, the majority
party can extract some of the policy gains from the ultimate buyer.
While the proof of this result does not extend immediately to all cases, the result does
hold generically. In fact, since we know from our previous results that for each (k,) the
set of matching parameters and preference proﬁles (ω, u) that admit a broker equilibrium,
say M, is closed and has a nonempty interior, we can just write this problem as that
of choosing (ω, u) ∈ M to maximize the net expected transfers to the broker, TB, and
check whether the solution, T ∗B, is such that T
∗
B < 0. We can then simply solve this
problem numerically, for each (k,). We do this in matlab, using the Global Optimization
Toolbox.18 Our numerical results extend the result of Proposition 5.10 to all (k,), and
conﬁrm that in a broker equilibrium the broker must also be a net loser of rents in
expectation.19
17This does not happen when A has a majority of the votes because any trade between B and C leads
A to implement her preferred policy outright, which prevents them from trading.
18All codes are available upon request.
19In the same way, we also showed that the results of Proposition 5.8 also extend to all (k,). Thus,
if there is a broker equilibrium, the broker prefers the policy of the ultimate buyer to both the policy of
the seller and the status quo.
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6 Conclusion
Enacting new policies in collective bodies requires compromises and political exchanges
among legislators with diﬀerent political views. This process of legislative bargaining has
two readily observable characteristics. First, compromises among members of a legislative
coalition are typically made in a decentralized bargaining process (i.e., backroom deals).
Second, whenever there are more than two legislative blocks, this process of decentralized
bargaining leads naturally to the emergence of legislative intermediaries. In this paper,
we proposed a model of legislative bargaining that captures this decentralized sequential
bargaining process, and focused on the role that political intermediaries can have in this
setting.
We showed that the emergence of legislative intermediaries is a robust equilibrium phe-
nomenon. The existence of a broker equilibrium (i) is generic, and does not depend (ii)
on special frictions in the opportunities that parties have to trade with one another, (iii)
on the initial allocation of voting rights, (iv) on the existence of cycles in the majority
preference or (v) on particular constraints in the dominance relations.
We showed that the triangulation of political agreements implemented by the broker
equilibrium can impact outcomes and welfare. In fact, we established conditions for the
existence of a broker equilibrium even when there is a dominant majority party; i.e., a
party that has both a majority of the votes, and a higher willingness to pay than all
others in binary comparisons. In this case, the broker equilibrium implements a diﬀerent
policy outcome than the one that would result in the absence of the broker, or in any
equilibrium maintaining the composition of the legislature.20 In particular, whenever
a broker equilibrium exists, it is the unique equilibrium that implements C’s preferred
outcome, and there is no equilibrium in which B implements its preferred outcome. In
addition, under some additional conditions the broker equilibrium is the unique Markov
Perfect equilibrium.
The existence of a broker equilibrium has direct empirical implications regarding the na-
ture of political trades, including which agents will, and which agents will not negotiate
20This equilibrium outcome is ineﬃcient whenever there are bargaining frictions, and can be ineﬃcient
even as frictions vanish. The ineﬃciency of vote trading in this setting is consistent with results in the
literature of noncooperative dynamic coalition formation in the presence of externalities, and provides
further evidence against the ability of markets for votes to attain eﬃcient outcomes.
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with each other, or will do so only after observing or negotiating other trades. In partic-
ular, when one party has a majority of the votes or there is no majority party but the
dominance relation cycles, the only constraint is that the ultimate buyer has a higher
preference intensity than (i.e., dominates) the broker; i.e., that C’s willingness to pay to
retain its preferred policy instead of that of B be larger than B’s willingness to pay to
retain its preferred policy instead of C’s. This is necessary of course, because otherwise
the broker would simply implement its preferred policy when it attains a majority of the
votes. When instead there is no majority party and the dominance relation is transitive,
neither the broker nor the ultimate buyer can dominate the seller. Thus, there can be
a broker equilibrium in which B brokers a deal transferring decision power from A to C
only if A would buy C’s votes in a two party committee.
We also establish the following additional empirical implications:
First, we show that in order to be able to fulﬁll this role, the broker must have a stake in
the policy outcome. In particular, the legislative intermediary must prefer the ﬁnal policy
outcome to both the status quo and the preferred policy of the party whom he initially
transacts with. In the case of euclidean preferences in a unidimensional policy space,
for instance, the broker’s ideal point must be closer to C’s ideal policy than to A’s ideal
policy. Second, we establish precise implications regarding the direction of transfers. As
one could anticipate, the agent implementing its preferred policy will be a net contributor
in expectation, and the original seller will be a net recipient of transfers in expectation.
What is less immediate, perhaps, is that for all allocations of voting rights and dominance
relations, the broker must also be a net contributor.
Third, we also show that reducing bargaining frictions (or increasing the discount factor
δ) makes political intermediation more likely – in the sense that the set of parameters for
which a broker equilibrium exists is increasing in δ – and increases all agents’ equilibrium
payoﬀs in a broker equilibrium.
More broadly, our results also suggest that in the context of decentralized bargaining,
the power of a legislative actor can be unrelated to its vote share or bargaining power,
instead being determined by the role they can attain in bringing a coalition together.21
This introduces a new mechanism to what has been outlined in the literature through
21This is diﬀerent, for example, that in Baron-Ferejohn models, where agents’ value is monotonic in
their proposal power; see Eraslan (2002).
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which small parties can have a disproportionate eﬀect on policy outcomes.
Throughout the paper, we have maintained the assumption that all actors in the model
are members of the legislature, and thus endowed with voting rights. However, nothing
in the model prevents the possibility that an outside party (say an interest group) plays
the role of the broker, if allowed to participate in backroom deals. In fact, given access,
an interest group is strategically equivalent to internal members, except that it cannot
sell votes in the initial round of decentralized bargaining. The conditions for existence
of a broker equilibrium in the paper are therefore also suﬃcient for existence of a broker
equilibrium with an outside broker.
The three party model that we studied in this paper has the minimal structure required
to study the emergence of an intermediary in legislative bargaining. The general set-up
of the model of decentralized bargaining with an arbitrary committee size n can be useful
to study issues that go beyond the analysis in this paper. A natural and interesting
direction for future research is to allow competition between middlemen. As we discussed
in the paper, a key consideration for the existence of a broker equilibrium is establishing
a chain of rent extraction from the party implementing its preferred policy to the initial
seller. This suggests the question: can competition among middlemen make equilibria
with intermediation more elusive? Does this answer depend on the position of these
agents in a network?22 We leave these questions for future research.
22With more than three players, the particular deﬁnition of a broker equilibrium that we used in this
paper would need to be amended slightly to reﬂect the fact that more than one player could act as a
broker (either in competition with one another, or as part of a chain of trades). Thus we would not
necessarily require that any particular broker trades on the equilibrium path with probability one, but
that some broker does.
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7 Appendix
Lemma 7.1 Suppose that the initial vote allocation at the beginning of a trading round
is k = (kA, kB, kC) with at least ki > 0 and kj > 0 for i, j ∈ {A,B,C}, let k′−j denote
the vote allocation that would result after i buys from j 	= i in that round. Then (0.a)
W iij(k; buy) = w
i(k′−j)+w
j(k′−j)−wj(k), (0.b) W iij(k; sell) = wi(k′−i)+wj(k′−i)−wj(k),
and (0.c) W iij(k;wait) = w
i(k), and thus:
1. W jji(k, buy) + w
i(k) = W iij(k, sell) + w
j(k).
2. W iij(k; sell) ≥ W iij(k; buy) if and only if wi(k′−i) + wj(k′−i) ≥ wi(k′−j) + wj(k′−j).
3. W iij(k; sell) ≥ W iij(k; buy) iﬀ W jji(k; buy) ≥ W jji(k; sell).
4. W iij(k; sell) ≥ W iij(k;wait) iﬀ W jji(k; buy) ≥ W jji(k;wait).
Proof of Lemma 7.1. To establish this result, note thatW iij(k; buy) = w
i(k′−j)−tbuyij (k).
For j to accept, wj(k′−j)+t
buy
ij (k) ≥ wj(k). Then in equilibrium tbuyij (k) = wj(k)−wj(k′−j).
Substituting,W iij(k; buy) = w
i(k′−j)+w
j(k′−j)−wj(k). Similarly,W iij(k; sell) = wi(k′−i)−
tsellij (k), and for j to accept, w
j(k′−i) + t
sell
ij (k) ≥ wj(k), so in equilibrium tsellij (k) =
wj(k)−wj(k′−i). Substituting, W iij(k; sell) = wi(k′−i)+wj(k′−i)−wj(k). This establishes
part 0. Parts 1 and 2 follow immediately from 0. Part 3 follows from 2, and part 4 follows
from 1.
Proposition 7.2 Suppose at time τ0 two parties, B and C, have voting rights, where
kB > kC but C  B. Then there exists a MPE in which, independently of who has the
opportunity to propose, C buys B’s votes and implements its preferred policy; i.e., yτ = zC
for all τ ≥ τ0. Moreover,
1. If u∗B ≤ δ ρBC SBC(zC), the majority party extends negotiations after disagreement.
Here WB(k) = ρBC SBC(zC), W
C(k) = ρCB SBC(zC), and u
∗
B ≤ δWB(k).
2. If u∗B ≥ δ ρBC SBC(zC) and (1 − δ)u∗B ≥ δρBC [SBC(zC)− SBC(zB)], B implements
zB after disagreement. Here W
B(k) = u∗B + ρBC(SBC(zC) − SBC(zB)), WC(k) =
uC(zB) + ρCB(SBC(zC)− SBC(zB)), and u∗B ≥ δWB(k).
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3. If neither of these conditions hold, there is no MPE in pure strategies. In equi-
librium, the majority party implements its preferred policy after disagreement with
probability
α∗ =
(1− δ)
δρBC
(
u∗B − δρBCSBC(zC)
δSBC(zC)− SBC(zB)
)
(8)
Here δWB(k) = u∗B and δW
C(k) = δSBC(zC)− u∗B.
Proof of Proposition 7.2. As in the statement of the proposition, suppose that
two parties, B and C, have voting rights, where kB > kC , and C  B. Let k =
(kB, kC , 0). Consider the problem of the majority party when it has an opportunity to
propose. B can, ﬁrst of all, choose not to make a relevant oﬀer (wait), guaranteeing its
post trade continuation value WBBC(k, wait) = w
B(k). The conjectures for the post-trade
continuation values wB(k) and wC(k) depend on whether B prefers to implement its
preferred policy or extend negotiations after disagreement: if u∗B ≥ δWB(k), B prefers to
implement zB and w
B(k) = u∗B, w
C(k) = uC(zB), and if u
∗
B < δW
B(k), then B prefers to
extend negotiations after disagreement, so wB(k) = δWB(k) and wC(k) = δWC(k).
But B can also exchange policy for rents by trading with C. If B makes a relevant sell
oﬀer to C, C will then implement zC , so B gets a payoﬀ W
B
BC(k, sell) = uB(zC)− tsellBC(k).
For the minority party to accept the oﬀer, WCBC(k, sell) = u
∗
C + t
sell
BC(k) ≥ wC(k). Thus
in equilibrium a relevant sell oﬀer has a transfer −tsellBC(k) = u∗C − wC(k), and
WBBC(k; sell) = SBC(zC)− wC(k)
Similarly, if B makes a relevant buy oﬀer,
WBBC(k, buy) = SBC(zB)− wC(k)
Note that selling dominates buying and implementing zB if and only if C  B, and
implementing zB dominates extending negotiations after disagreement if and only if u
∗
B ≥
δWB(k). Thus, if u∗B ≥ δWB(k), B makes C a relevant sell oﬀer. When instead u∗B ≤
δWB(k), B either waits or makes C a relevant sell oﬀer. Since in this case the majority
party extends negotiations in the event that C rejects an oﬀer, wB(k) = δWB(k) and
wC(k) = δWC(k), and B sells to C if and only if SBC(zC) ≥ δ
[
WB(k) +WC(k)
]
. To
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summarize, when B has the opportunity to propose and C  B, it sells if either (i)
u∗B ≥ δWB(k) or (ii) u∗B ≤ δWB(k) and SBC(zC) ≥ δ
[
WB(k) +WC(k)
]
, and otherwise
waits and extends negotiations.
Establishing C’s best response in the trading node ((C,B),k) for ﬁxed continuation values
follows from Lemma 7.1. The minority party B can buy, sell or wait. If it waits, it
gets WCCB(k, wait) = w
C(k), and by Lemma 7.1, WCCB(k, buy) = SBC(zC) − wB(k) and
WCCB(k, sell) = SBC(zB) − wB(k). Thus, given C  B, C either waits or makes B a
relevant buy oﬀer. If u∗B ≥ δWB(k), the majority party implements zB after disagreement,
and buying dominates waiting for C since WCCB(k; buy) ≥ WCCB(k;wait) ⇔ C  B. If
instead u∗B ≤ δWB(k), C prefers to trade if and only if SBC(zC) ≥ δ
[
WB(k) +WC(k)
]
.
Proving the statements in the proposition now only requires to check the consistency of
these best responses when values are determined endogenously.
Part 1. Suppose that in equilibrium (i) u∗B ≤ δWB(k) and (ii) SBC(zC) ≥ δ[WB(k) +
WC(k)]. Then C buys from B in both trading nodes and implements zC , while the
majority party extends negotiations after disagreement. Then
W j(k) = δW j(k) + ρji
{
SBC(zC)− δ[WB(k) +WC(k)]
}
for j = B,C,
and therefore WB(k) = ρBCSBC(zC) and W
C(k) = ρCBSBC(zC). Substituting in u
∗
B <
δWB(k) gives u∗B ≤ δρBCSBC(zC). Substituting in SBC(zC) ≥ δ[WB(k) +WC(k)] gives
SBC(zC) ≥ 0, which is implied by u∗B ≤ δρBCSBC(zC).
Part 2. Suppose that in equilibrium u∗B ≥ δWB(k). Then C buys from B in both trading
nodes and implements zC , while B implements its preferred policy after disagreement, so
W (k) = u(zB) + ρj(SBC(zC)− SBC(zB)) for  = B,C
Substituting back in u∗B ≥ δWB(k) gives (1− δ)u∗B ≥ δρBC [SBC(zC)− SBC(zB)].
Part 3. Finally, suppose that in equilibrium (i) u∗B < δW
B(k) and (ii) SBC(zC) <
δ[WB(k) + WC(k)]. Then B does not make a relevant oﬀer in ((B,C),k) and C does
not make a relevant oﬀer in ((C,B),k), after which B extends negotiations. As a result,
agreement is never reached, and therefore WB(k) = 0 and WC(k) = 0. Substituting
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in (i), we get u∗B < 0, which is impossible as long as zB 	= Q. This shows that (i)
there does not exist a MPE in which B and C do not trade in ((B,C),k) or ((C,B),k)
and B extends negotiations. It remains to show that if (i) u∗B > δρBCSBC(zC) and (ii)
(1 − δ)u∗B < δρBC [SBC(zC)− SBC(zB)], there exists a MPE in which B sells to C when
they meet and B implements zB after disagreement with probability α
∗ ∈ (0, 1), and
extends negotiations with probability 1 − α∗, with α∗ as deﬁned in (8). To show this,
we compute the values implied by this strategy proﬁle and use the fact that B has to
be indiﬀerent between implementing zB and extending negotiations after disagreement to
compute α∗ (details are available from the authors upon request).
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Consider WC(k). Note that in all trading nodes ((i, j),k)
other than ((A,B),k) or ((B,A),k), WCij (k) = δW
C(k), and WCAB(k) = W
C
BA(k) =
δWC(k′BC) = δρCBSCB(zC). Then
WC(k) =
δ(pAB + pBA)ρCBSCB(zC)
(1− δ) + δ(pAB + pBA)
Now consider W (k) for  ∈ {A,B}. Note that in all trading nodes ((i, j),k) other than
((A,B),k) and ((B,A),k), W ij(k) = δW
(k), while W AB(k) = W

BA(k) = Π(AB,C) −
δW j(k), for j ∈ {A,B} \ . Then
W (k) =
pj[Π(AB,C)− δW j(k)]
1− δ(1− pj) (9)
Solving the system (9) for  = A,B, we get
WA(k) =
pABΠ(AB,C)
(1− δ) + δ(pAB + pBA) and W
B(k) =
pBAΠ(AB,C)
(1− δ) + δ(pAB + pBA)
Lemma 7.3 Assume the dominance relation A  C  B,A  B. There exists a broker
equilibrium with a dominant majority party A if and only if there are payoﬀs ui(zj) ∈ R
for i, j ∈ N such that and the following system of linear inequalities is satisﬁed:
υu∗A − δ2 pAB uA(zC)− δ2 pAB ρBC u∗C − δ2 pAB ρBC uB(zC) ≤ 0 (1b)
−δ ρBC u∗C − δ ρBC uB(zC) + u∗B ≤ 0 (2b)
37
u∗A + uB(zA)− δuA(zC)− δ ρBC u∗C − δ ρBC uB(zC) ≤ 0 (3b)
−uA(zC)− ρBC u∗C − ρBC uB(zC) ≤ 0 (4b)
υu∗A + υuC(zA)− δ2 pAB uA(zC)− δ2 θ u∗C − δ2 θ uB(zC) ≤ 0 (5b)
υuC(zA) + υuB(zA)− δ2 pBA uA(zC)− δ2 μu∗C − δ2 μuB(zC) ≤ 0 (6b)
Proof of Theorem 5.4. The equilibrium conditions (1)-(6) together with the require-
ment that u ∈ U , and the dominance relations A  C, C  B, and A  B form a
system of linear inequalities in the unknowns ui(zj), which can be written as Λu ≤ α,
where αT ≡ (09,−b9),
uT =
(
u∗A uC(zA) uC(zA) uA(zC) u
∗
C uB(zC) uA(zB) uC(zB) u
∗
C
)
,
and
Λ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
υ υ 0 −δ2pAB −δ2θ −δ2θ 0 0 0
0 υ υ −δ2pBA −δ2μ −δ2μ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −δρBC −δρBC 0 0 1
1 0 1 −δ −δρBC −δρBC 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 −ρBC −ρBC 0 0 0
υ 0 0 −δ2pAB −δ2pABρBC −δ2pABρBC 0 0 0
−1 −1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 −1 0 1 1
−1 0 −1 0 0 0 1 0 1
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(The rows in the matrix correspond to the inequalities in the text in the following order.
The ﬁrst six rows are inequalities (6b), (7b), (3b), (4b), (5b), (2b). The next three rows
are the dominance order, and the last nine rows guarantee that for all i, j ∈ N , u∗i > ui(zj)
38
and u∗i > 0 = ui(Q).)
It follows from Lemma 5.3 that our original system of inequalities does not have a solution
if there exists a λ ≥ 0 such that:
υλ1 + λ4 + υλ6 − λ7 − λ9 − λ10 − λ11 − λ12 = 0
υλ1 + υλ2 − λ7 + λ14 = 0
υλ2 + λ4 − λ9 + λ17 = 0 (10)
−δ2pABλ1 − δ2pBAλ2 − δλ4 − λ5 − δ2pABλ6 + λ7 + λ11 = 0
−δ2θλ1− δ2μλ2− δρBCλ3− δρBCλ4−ρBCλ5− δ2pABρBCλ6+λ7−λ8−λ13−λ14−λ15 = 0
−δ2θλ1 − δ2μλ2 − δρBCλ3 − δρBCλ4 − ρBCλ5 − δ2pABρBCλ6 − λ8 + λ18 = 0 (11)
λ9 + λ12 = 0 (12)
λ8 + λ15 = 0 (13)
λ3 + λ8 + λ9 − λ16 − λ17 − λ18 = 0
and
18∑
i=10
λi > 0 (14)
From (12), λ9 = λ12 = 0, from (13), λ8 = λ15 = 0, and from (10) and λ9 = 0, λ2 =
λ4 = λ17 = 0. After substituting, we can further obtain λ3 = λ16 + λ18 ≥ 0, and
λ7 = υλ1 + λ14 ≥ 0. Substituting, the dual system becomes
υλ6 − λ14 − λ10 − λ11 = 0 (15)
[υ − δ2pAB]λ1 − λ5 − δ2pABλ6 + λ14 + λ11 = 0
[υ − δ2θ]λ1 − δρBCλ16 − δρBCλ18 − ρBCλ5 − δ2pABρBCλ6 − λ13 = 0
−δ2θλ1 − ρBCλ5 − δ2pABρBCλ6 − δρBCλ16 + [1− δρBC ]λ18 = 0 (16)
and
λ10 + λ11 + λ13 + λ14 + λ16 + λ18 > 0
39
From (15), υλ6 = λ10 + λ11 + λ14 ≥ 0, and from (16), [1 − δρBC ]λ18 = δ2θλ1 + ρBCλ5 +
δ2pABρBCλ6 + δρBCλ16 ≥ 0. Substituting, and simplifying, the dual system is
[υ − δ2pAB]λ1 − λ5 − δ
2pAB
υ
λ10 +
[
υ − δ2pAB
υ
]
λ11 +
[
υ − δ2pAB
υ
]
λ14 = 0 (17)
[
(1− δρBC)υ − δ2θ
]
λ1 = ρBCλ5 + (1− δρBC)λ13 + δρBCλ16 + δ
2pABρBC
υ
(λ10 + λ11 + λ14)
(18)
and
δ2θλ1 + ρBCλ5 + δ
2pABρBCλ6 + (1− δρBC)[λ10 + λ11 + λ13 + λ14] + λ16 > 0 (19)
Since all the coeﬃcients on the RHS of (18) are positive, a necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition for the solution of the dual system is that the coeﬃcient of λ1 is positive as well,
i.e., (1− δρBC)υ− δ2θ > 0. Therefore (1− δρBC)υ− δ2θ ≤ 0 is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the existence of a solution to the primal.
The proof of Proposition 5.5 uses the following lemma.
Lemma 7.4 If ω ≡ (p, ρ, δ) ∈ Ω∗, there is an open subset U ⊂ U such that for every
u ∈ U , the legislative bargaining game with parameters (ω, u) admits a broker equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 7.4. Denote the dominance relation under preference proﬁle u by
u. We say that i u j is stronger than i u′ j if u∗i + uj (zi) − (ui (zj) + u∗j) >
u∗′i + u
′
j (zi)− (u′i (zj) + u∗′j ).
Take any pair (ω, uω) ∈ Ω∗ × U such that (ω, uω) admits a broker equilibrium. First
note that reducing uA (zB) makes the dominance relation A  B stronger and does not
aﬀect any of the conditions in (1b)− (6b). Note that by increasing uB(zC) all conditions
in (1b) − (6b) hold with strict inequality and the dominance relation C  B becomes
stronger. Moreover, since uω ∈ U , uB(zC) < u∗B, the increment in uB(zC) can be small
enough to remain in U . Note now that reducing uA(zC) makes the dominance relation
A  C stronger but makes all conditions (1b)−(6b) but (2b), tighter. Therefore, choosing
uA(zC) and uA (zB) appropriately we have that there is some u
′ close to uω such that
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(ω, u′) veriﬁes all conditions in (1b)− (6b) with strict inequality, the dominance relations
are stronger under u′ than under uω, and u′ ∈ intU . Because all inequalities are not strict
there is an open ball Uuω ⊂ intU around u′ such that for every u′′ ∈ Uuω the legislative
bargaining (ω, u′′) admits a broker equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5.5. By Lemma 7.4, for every ω ∈ int(Ω∗) there is an open subset
Uω ⊂ U such that for every u ∈ Uω, the legislative bargaining game with parameters (ω, u)
admits a broker equilibrium. Since every (ω, u) veriﬁes (1b)− (6b) with strict inequality,
the dominance relations are also strict, and u ∈ int(U), it is easy to construct an open
ball Pω around ω such that any pair (ω, u) ∈ (Pω × Uω) veriﬁes (1b) − (6b) with strict
inequality, the dominance relations are also strict, and u ∈ int(U) (and therefore admits
a broker equilibrium).
Proof of Proposition 5.10. The result for C was proved in the text. Now consider
the broker, party B. As before TB = WB − PVB. Then substituting from Lemma 5.2,
and (7), we have
TB =
δ
υ
{pBA[uA(zC) + ρBCSBC(zC)]− (pAB + pBA)uB(zC)}
≤ 1
υδ
[
δ2 (pBA + pAB)− υ
]
SAC (zC) < 0,
where we used (5b), A  C, and the fact that SAC (zC) > 0, by (2b). The result for A
follows because
∑
iW
i =
∑
i PVi =
δ
υ
(pAB + pBA)
∑
ui(zC).
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